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Adams v. Florida Power Corp. and the Trend of
Lowering an Employer’s Burden of Proof to Rebut
Age Discrimination Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act, which opened
the energy industry to competition and forced the Florida Power
Corporation, once a publicly regulated utility monopoly, to
1
reorganize. In the course of those reorganizations, the Florida
Power Corporation terminated Wanda Adams and 117 others, all of
2
whom were over forty years of age. The terminated employees
formed a class and sued the Florida Power Corporation and its
parent corporation, the Florida Progress Corporation, on a theory of
3
disparate impact. The district court certified the class of plaintiffs,
but later decertified it and ruled that as a matter of law, without
making findings of fact, disparate impact cannot form a basis for
4
liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Adams and her fellow employees appealed the district court’s
5
decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the ADEA
precludes disparate impact liability. In doing so, it took a stand on an
6
issue that has caused a pervasive circuit split: it is generally
recognized that the ADEA prohibits disparate treatment of workers
7
because of their age, but the federal circuits are split on whether the
1. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001).
2. Id.; Glen Elsasser & Judy Peres, High Court to Mull Age Bias in Layoffs, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 4, 2001, at 11.
3. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1323. For an explanation of the meaning of the terms
“disparate impact” and “disparate treatment,” as used in this Note, see infra Part II.B.
4. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1323–24. This is a condensed version of the facts and only
contains those facts essential to understanding the case. The district court’s opinion is
unpublished. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623
(2000).
5. Id. at 1323.
6. Id. at 1324–25.
7. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“The disparate
treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of that statute makes
clear.”).
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ADEA prohibits disparate impact as well. The issue is crucial:
whether plaintiffs seeking relief under a theory of disparate impact
can recover for age discrimination will have a serious effect on the
scope of the ADEA, which will likely be increasingly litigated as
9
more workers continue to work past retirement age.
This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that
the ADEA precludes disparate impact claims, but that the court’s
analysis illuminates a judicial tendency to dilute the ADEA’s
reasonable factors test. In the past, that trend had been perpetuated
10
by applying Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting scheme to ADEA
cases, but the Adams decision dilutes the reasonable factors test by
analogizing between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act (EPA).
However it is accomplished, such a dilution makes it easier for
allegedly infringing employers to justify their actions and is in
contravention of Congress’s intent in enacting the ADEA. The
Eleventh Circuit should have instead relied on an alternative plain
language argument—presented in this Note—to resolve the claims of
the terminated Florida Power Corporation employees. Part II of this
Note provides background into the ADEA’s pertinent provisions and
the definition of disparate impact. Part III outlines the history of
disparate impact vis-à-vis the ADEA and explains the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Adams. Part IV identifies the accepted judicial
application of Title VII burden-shifting to the ADEA—an
application that, in some instances, may allow employers to escape
discrimination liability without meeting the statutory requirement to
8. For cases holding that the ADEA permits disparate impact liability, see Criley v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union,
114 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 350, 998
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000). For
cases holding that the ADEA precludes disparate impact liability, see Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,
164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.
1995); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073
(7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
9. A recent study indicated that 69 percent of workers in the current workforce plan on
working past retirement. Hire Consulting Services, Survey: Majority of Workers Won’t Quit at
65, in THE HIRE REPORT, at http://www.hireconsultant.com/HireReport3.htm (last visited
Sep. 23, 2002). This trend has resulted in an increase in complaints filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Michele Himmelberg, Age-based Complaints on the
Rise, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, July 30, 2002, http://www.ocregister.com/archive/
(“Age-discrimination complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
increased 13 percent in 2000 and rose almost 9 percent last year [2001] to 17,405.”).
10. See infra Part IV.A for an explanation of Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting
scheme. See also infra Part IV.C.1 for a history of that scheme.
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show that the allegedly discriminatory employment action was based
on reasonable factors other than age, thereby diluting the ADEA’s
reasonable factors test. Part IV will also show how the Eleventh
Circuit demonstrated this judicial tendency to weaken the ADEA’s
reasonable factors defense by analogizing between the ADEA and
11
the EPA, as well as how that analogy may illustrate a new rationale
for lowering a defendant employer’s burden of proof. Diluting the
ADEA’s reasonability requirement to any degree beyond that
evinced in the Act’s statutory language is impermissible because it
makes it easier for allegedly infringing employers to defend
themselves against the discrimination liability that Congress intended
them to face; in cases where plaintiff employees do not have
sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant’s proffered reasons
for its allegedly discriminatory action are pretextual, a defendant can
escape liability without the statutorily-required showing of
reasonable factors other than age. The burden-shifting scheme that
has produced this result is inapplicable in ADEA contexts, and
reducing an employer’s burden by any means allows employers to
escape liability in situations where Congress likely intended them to
face liability. Part V argues that the Eleventh Circuit could have
avoided participating in the trend to dilute the ADEA’s reasonability
requirement simply by considering the ADEA’s plain language; Part
V presents the plain language argument that the Eleventh Circuit
should have used and demonstrates how that analysis solves the
question at bar without needlessly diluting the ADEA’s reasonability
requirement. A plain language analysis yields a conclusion consistent
with Supreme Court statements on the issue, the congressionallystated purpose of the ADEA, and the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion
12
that Title VII and the ADEA are not analogous, and would
11. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000). The Equal Pay Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . except where such payment is made
pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
Id. (emphasis added). See infra Part IV.B for an explanation of the analogy the Eleventh
Circuit employed.
12. Proponents of allowing disparate impact liability under the ADEA have pointed to
cases holding that disparate impact liability is available under Title VII and that the prohibitory
language of Title VII and the ADEA is the same; therefore, the ADEA must also allow
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preserve the Adams court’s correct analysis of those issues. Part VI
offers conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
13

14

The ADEA protects workers over forty years of age and
prohibits three principal groups from engaging in age discrimination:
15
employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.
According to section 623(a), employers may not fire, refuse to hire,
or discriminate against any employee by paying that employee less or
by providing inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of that employee’s age; additionally, employers may not
disparate impact liability. See infra Part III.A. To illustrate, note for example that the ADEA’s
prohibition against age discrimination by an employer makes it illegal for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(3) (2000). Likewise, Title VII makes it unlawful
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). See infra Part V.D for an explanation of why Title VII
and the ADEA are in fact not analogous.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 623. The ADEA is a detailed system of rules; this section will therefore
discuss only those rules most pertinent to an analysis of disparate impact theory under the
ADEA.
14. Id. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who
are at least 40 years of age.”). Though the ADEA protects workers of over forty years of age, it
“does not provide a remedy for reverse age discrimination,” i.e., discrimination based on the
youth of an employee, rather than old age. Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228
(7th Cir. 1992).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c). For additional expositions of the ADEA’s prohibitions, see
Kay H. Hodge, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, SG060 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 337, 340–
41 (2002); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, and the Displaced
Homemaker, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (Autumn 1986).
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segregate or classify any employee in any way because of that
employee’s age that would adversely affect that employee, nor can
they reduce the wages of younger employees in order to mask a
discriminatory discrepancy between younger and older employees’
16
wages.
Section 623(f) of the ADEA sets forth categories of permissible
employment practices which would otherwise be impermissible if not
17
explicitly sanctioned. First, it permits employers to engage in what
would otherwise be discriminatory behavior so long as “age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
18
operation of the particular business.” Second, and most important
for purposes of this Note, it allows employers to differentiate
19
between employees “based on reasonable factors other than age.”
Third, it also allows employers to violate the ADEA’s provisions if
compliance with the Act would be illegal in the country where the
20
workplace is located, if a foreign country. Employers may also
21
22
observe a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit plan,
23
even if such systems or plans violate the ADEA.
B. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Defined
Disparate impact claims “involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
24
by business necessity.” The United States Supreme Court has held
that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a
25
disparate-impact theory.” For example, a disparate impact claim
might challenge a policy to require a job applicant’s birthdate; that
policy may not have as its purpose the weeding out of older

16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(3).
17. For further reading on the ADEA’s prohibitions, see Hodge, supra note 15, at 341–
42; Yarbrough, supra note 15, at 110–11.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 623(f)(2)(A).
22. Id. § 623(f)(2)(B).
23. Id. § 623(f)(2). For an additional enumeration of defenses provided for under the
ADEA, see Hodge, supra note 15, at 341–42.
24. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
25. Id.
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applicants, but it may deter older employees from applying for the
job or, at a minimum, cause an unsuccessful applicant to believe that
26
she was not hired because of her age. In that circumstance, the
plaintiff employee would not need to demonstrate that the employer
intended to discriminate against older applicants; she would only
need to prove that the employer’s policy “more harshly” impacted
older applicants.
Disparate treatment, on the other hand, is intentional
discrimination. It occurs when an employer purposefully
discriminates in her employment decisions on the basis of the
27
employee’s race, gender, religion, or some other characteristic. In a
disparate treatment claim, therefore, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
defendant employer’s discriminatory intent. In contrast to a disparate
impact claim, which argues that an otherwise facially neutral
employment policy impacts one class of workers more harshly than
another, a disparate treatment claim would, for example, claim that
28
an employee had been terminated because of sex or race. In a
disparate impact claim, those characteristics are incidental to the
discrimination; in a disparate treatment claim, those characteristics
are the reason for the discrimination.

26. Michael Faillace, Current Employment Law Issues, 687 PRACTISING L. INST./PAT.
205, 211 (2002) (noting that “while asking for [an] applicant’s date of birth does not in and
of itself violate the statute, such a request may tend to either deter older applicants or could
permit a discriminatory inference of age discrimination if the applicant is not hired”).
27. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (noting that disparate treatment occurs when
“[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion [or other protected characteristics]” and that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment”); see also Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir.
1988) (noting that a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment must show discriminatory motive as
well as disparate treatment but that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment by simply presenting evidence of disparate treatment). For more reading on the
difference between a disparate impact claim and a disparate treatment claim, including
evidentiary standards, see Laina Rose Reinsmith, Note, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate
Treatment Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, 55 VAND. L. REV. 219, 224–39 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 303 F.3d 817, 819, 830 n.6 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that a doctor claimed, under a disparate treatment theory, that she had
been terminated from her employment as an assistant professor of microbiology because of her
sex, race, and national origin).
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III. THE ADAMS DECISION: OUTLINING AND TAKING A STAND ON
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. How the Circuit Split Arose
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Florida Power Corp.
maps out the path that disparate impact theory took in integrating
29
itself into ADEA jurisprudence. That path began with two United
States Supreme Court decisions. In 1971, the Court decided Griggs
30
v. Duke Power Co., which held that disparate impact in employment
31
discrimination was a cognizable injury under Title VII. Then, in
32
1978, the Court decided Lorillard v. Pons, which pointed out that
the language of Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination mirrors
that of the ADEA; specifically, the Court noted that “the
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title
33
VII.” Taken together, those decisions seem to say that disparate
impact liability is available under the ADEA; if disparate impact
liability is available under Title VII, and the prohibitory language of
the ADEA mirrors that of Title VII, then the ADEA must also
permit disparate impact liability.
34
Twenty-two years after Griggs, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
the Supreme Court attacked the notion that disparate impact was a
cognizable injury under the ADEA, but not in a way that would
provide clear guidance to other courts deciding that issue. Hearing
the case of an ADEA-covered employee who was terminated
35
immediately before his pension benefits vested, the Court noted
that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what
36
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA,” and that “[w]hen the
employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age,
the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears.
29. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. Id. at 431; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982) (noting that
the “legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII” shows that “Congress
recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis employed by the Court in Griggs”).
32. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
33. Id. at 584. See supra note 12 for a brief explanation of Title VII’s relevance to this
Note’s argument, as well as the relevant text of both the ADEA and Title VII.
34. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
35. Id. at 606–07.
36. Id. at 610.
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This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with
37
age . . . .” Also, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted
that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over
38
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.” On their
face, these statements seem to conclusively demonstrate that the
Court believed disparate impact to have no place in ADEA
jurisprudence, but the majority explicitly noted that Hazen Paper
was a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact case, and that
the Court had “never decided whether a disparate impact theory of
liability is available under the ADEA” and that it would not do so in
39
deciding Hazen Paper. In addition, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
explained that “nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as
incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called ‘disparate impact’
40
theory of Title VII.” As such, even though the Court seems to
believe that disparate impact has no place in ADEA jurisprudence,
there is considerable doubt as to whether Hazen Paper is a disparate
impact case at all.
Two perspectives therefore result. One perspective relies on the
similarity in language between the ADEA and Title VII and the fact
that the Hazen Paper Court explicitly refused to invalidate that
argument. The other perspective relies on the Hazen Paper dicta to
argue that disparate impact liability has no place in ADEA
jurisprudence. Those two conflicting perspectives caused a split in
the circuits. The Eleventh Circuit in Adams noted that “[t]he
Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have read [the language in
Hazen specifying that the Supreme Court does not decide whether
disparate impact may form a basis for liability under the ADEA]
41
literally and continue to allow disparate impact claims.” However,
the “First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have questioned
the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA post42
Hazen.” These cases rely both on the Hazen Paper majority
43
opinion and concurring statements.

37. Id. at 611.
38. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 610.
40. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001); see supra note 8
for cases holding that the ADEA permits disparate impact liability.
42. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1324–25; see supra note 8 for cases holding that the ADEA
precludes disparate impact liability. In Adams, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly names the Sixth
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B. The Reasoning in Adams

44

After presenting the history of disparate impact in the ADEA
context and outlining the circuit split on that issue, the court in
Adams went on to reject the claim that disparate impact can form
the foundation for a claim under the ADEA. In doing so, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on the plain language of the ADEA, its
legislative history, and an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
Hazen Paper decision.
The court began by addressing whether Title VII and the ADEA
are analogous. Specifically, the court cites as a key difference section
623(f)(1) of the ADEA, which explains that “[i]t shall not be
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited
under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section . . . where the
45
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age . . . .”
Title VII contains no such provision, so this language must be read
to preclude disparate impact from the scope of the ADEA; if not, “it
becomes nothing more than a bromide to the effect that ‘only age
discrimination is age discrimination,’” producing “a circular
46
construction” that would render the provision superfluous.
The court argues that this language is more similar to that found
in the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits gender-based wage
discrimination unless the discriminatory result is “based on any other
47
factor other than sex.” The court then cites County of Washington
v. Gunther, in which the Supreme Court held that the Equal Pay Act
48
precludes disparate impact claims, and argues that if the two
provisions are linguistically similar, and the EPA precludes disparate
impact, then the ADEA must preclude disparate impact as well.

Circuit as one that has questioned whether disparate impact is available under the ADEA. The
Sixth Circuit, although recognizing that “[t]here is considerable doubt as to whether a claim
of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory,” has actually “stated that a
disparate-impact theory of age discrimination may be possible.” Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 53
F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995).
43. The Adams decision also mentions that these circuits have relied on “other factors”
in deciding against applying disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325.
44. For a synopsis of the facts in Adams, see supra Part I.
45. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000)).
46. Id. (quoting Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999)).
47. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv)).
48. Id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170–71 (1981)).
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After holding, through these comparisons, that the ADEA
precludes disparate impact, the court goes on to note that the
ADEA’s legislative history further distinguishes it from Title VII.
The court cites a report, issued by the Secretary of Labor before the
49
ADEA was adopted, on age discrimination. That report, according
to the court, “recommended that Congress ban arbitrary
discrimination, such as disparate treatment based on stereotypical
perceptions of the elderly, but that factors affecting older workers,
such as policies with disparate impact, [should] be addressed in
50
alternative ways.” That report was key in the drafting of the ADEA.
As such, the ADEA’s legislative history differs from that of Title VII,
which did not have as its policy the suppression of stereotypes and
51
should not be compared.
Finally, the court admits that the Hazen Paper decision did not
explicitly address disparate impact under the ADEA, but contends
that the Supreme Court’s language in that decision hints that the
Court is inclined to preclude disparate impact from the ADEA. First,
the court cites to the Hazen Paper Court’s observation that disparate
treatment (and by inference, not disparate impact) is the “essence”
52
of the ADEA’s prohibition. Second, the court points out that the
Hazen Paper Court noted that disparate impact “[does] not rely on
‘inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes’”—the problem the ADEA
sought to remedy—and therefore does not fall within the ambit of
53
the ADEA. The majority therefore affirmed the district court’s
ruling against plaintiffs that disparate impact cannot form the basis of
an ADEA claim.

49. Id. at 1325–26.
50. Id. (citing Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702–03; Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999,
1008 (10th Cir. 1996)).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 621. Congress’s findings of fact included findings that older
workers are “disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment” because of increased
affluence; that employers commonly set arbitrary age limits; that unemployment is higher
among older workers than it is among younger workers; and that arbitrary discrimination
affects commerce. Id. Its stated purpose in enacting the ADEA was to “promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment.” Id. There is no statement concerning the suppression
of stereotypes.
52. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610
(1993)).
53. Id. (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611).
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In her concurrence, Judge Barkett joins with the majority’s
holding, but on the ground that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not
plead “a disparate impact claim sufficient to qualify for class
certification”; she therefore argues that it is unnecessary in this case
to decide whether disparate impact is a viable basis for liability under
54
the ADEA. That said, she proceeds to argue that disparate impact
may act as a basis of ADEA liability, taking the position advocated by
the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: that the Hazen Paper Court
explicitly refused to decide whether disparate impact may form a
basis for ADEA liability, therefore making any language to the
55
contrary inapposite; that section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA does not
bar disparate impact from the ADEA, but rather constitutes a
statutory manifestation of the commonly accepted business necessity
56
defense; that the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA are really not
57
analogous; and that the legislative history does not in fact betray an
58
intent to exclude disparate impact from ADEA jurisprudence.
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Adams relied
upon several distinct lines of reasoning. First, it conducted a faux
plain language analysis and reasoned that Title VII and the ADEA
are not analogous and that the ADEA is, in fact, more analogous to
the Equal Pay Act—a provision which, the Supreme Court has held,
does not allow disparate impact theories. It then reasoned that the
ADEA’s legislative history indicates a congressional intent to remove
disparate impact from the purview of the ADEA. Finally, it reasoned
that in Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court manifested its inclination to
reject disparate impact claims under the ADEA. As will be
demonstrated in the remainder of this Note, the court’s conclusions
with respect to Title VII, the ADEA’s legislative history, and the
54. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1329 (Barkett, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1327 (Barkett, J., concurring). The business necessity defense allows a
defendant employer to defend herself against a discrimination action by showing that the
employment decision in controversy was related to employment and justified by a business
necessity. See Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose By Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet:
Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 576–79 (1996) (explaining the business necessity defense).
57. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1328–29. Judge Barkett noted that the remedial provisions of
the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act are analogous, but the substantive provisions, which were
the proper focus of the court’s analysis in Adams, are not. Id. Also, the Equal Pay Act requires
a neutral explanation, not a presentation of “reasonable factors” as required by the ADEA. For
an explanation of the difference this makes in the Adams majority’s analysis, see infra Part IV.
58. Id. at 1330–31.
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Supreme Court’s statements were all correct; its analogy between the
ADEA and the Equal Pay Act, however, could prove disastrous for
future disparate treatment plaintiffs.
IV. HOW THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ILLUMINATED THE JUDICIAL
TENDENCY TO DILUTE THE ADEA’S REASONABLE FACTORS
EXCEPTION
The Eleventh Circuit correctly held that the ADEA precludes
disparate impact claims and provided a correct answer to the circuit
59
split, but its analysis is dangerous to future disparate treatment
plaintiffs. Its analogy between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act was
designed to show that because the ADEA is linguistically akin to the
Equal Pay Act—a statute that the Supreme Court has held to
preclude disparate impact—the ADEA should be similarly construed.
Its result, however, may be to articulate an interpretation of the term
“reasonable,” as used in the ADEA, so as to make it inordinately
difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to successfully sue
discriminating employers. If this is indeed the result of the analogy,
then Adams would conform to a long line of cases that improperly
dilute the term “reasonable.”
This Part will first analyze the tripartite burden-shifting scheme
currently applied in ADEA cases and demonstrate that, in some
cases, the scheme may significantly reduce the burden of proof a
defendant must meet to rebut a prima facie case of age
discrimination. It will then analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s analogy
between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act and show how the
analogy also reduces a defendant’s burden of proof, although
through a different means; this illustrates a judicial trend, manifested
in at least two ways, of limiting a defendant’s burden of proof. This
Part will then present two reasons why diluting the ADEA’s
reasonability requirement is improper. First, cases applying the
tripartite burden-shifting scheme to ADEA cases rely on unfounded
reasoning. Second, diluting the reasonable factors exception is
inconsistent with Congress’s intent in passing the ADEA.

59. The argument that the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct result will be presented
infra Part V. That Part will argue that a plain language analysis—the more appropriate analysis
in this case—reaches the same result.
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A. The Trend of Reducing a Defendant Employer’s Burden of Proof
Courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have departed from the
plain language of the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age”
test by applying Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting to ADEA cases.
60
That burden-shifting scheme is tripartite in nature. First, an ADEA
61
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. A plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case by demonstrating (1) that she was at least forty years
old at the time of termination; (2) that she was terminated; (3) that
she was meeting the defendant employer’s reasonable expectations of
employee performance at the time of the termination; and (4) that
62
she was replaced by a younger employee. Once the plaintiff
establishes that prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts
to the employer, who must defend by presenting evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory
63
action. According to the Eleventh Circuit, “a legally sufficient,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [exists] if the defendant

60. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996)
(applying Title VII burden-shifting to an ADEA case).
61. Id. at 310.
62. See Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2003). But see
O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312 (noting that a requirement that a terminated worker be replaced
by someone under forty years of age is irrelevant to the proper analysis: “[t]he fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is . . .
irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age”).
63. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311. This Note will assume that a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” is synonymous with a “reasonable factor other than age.” That
assumption, however, is only for purposes of simplifying the Note’s argument. See infra note
70 for some explanation of why the two standards may in fact not be synonymous. Whatever
the term used, it seems that a defendant employer would have two opportunities to invoke that
defense. First, a defendant may move to dismiss a claim based on legitimate but
nondiscriminatory reasons, or reasonable factors, on the ground that it fails to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)—that it is, in fact, a disparate impact
claim for which the ADEA grants no remedy. Second, a defendant may invoke such reasons or
factors to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case. The obvious difference is that the former situation
awards dismissal based solely on the pleadings, while the latter is an affirmative defense granted
after the production of at least some evidence. See Mayer, 318 F.3d at 807 (noting that once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a defendant employer “must then produce evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for terminating plaintiff). No matter which term is used,
these are a defendant’s opportunities to take the case out of the scope of disparate treatment
and place it in the netherworld of disparate impact; the two phrases, though different, would
fulfill the same procedural role. This Note argues simply that the phrase “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” should be replaced with the phrase “reasonable factors other than
age”—that an employer should be required to produce reasonable reasons rather than
legitimate reasons as defined herein. See supra Part V.A.
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articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which it
64
based its subjective opinion.” A defendant employer meets its
burden when the admissible “evidence raises a genuine issue of fact
as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff with clear reasons
65
for its decision;” evidence, not mere testimony, must be presented
66
to meet that burden. If the defendant remains silent, the court will
67
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law;
presumably, the same result obtains if, for some reason, the
defendant cannot meet its burden. But if the defendant meets its
burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason set forth by the defendant is a
68
pretext.
This burden-shifting scheme is, in some cases, fundamentally
inconsistent with the ADEA’s requirement that a defendant
employer defend itself by producing “reasonable factors other than
age” for its employment decision. As noted, once the defendant
employer presents evidence sufficient to shift its burden, the plaintiff
then must show that the reasons the defendant proffered for its
allegedly discriminatory action are pretextual. There are clearly some
situations where the defendant can present irrefutable evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and rightly avoid liability.
However, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s
reasons are pretextual, then it follows that the reasons the defendant
proffered were plainly never reasonable, for a proffered reason cannot
69
be both pretextual and reasonable. The tripartite burden-shifting
scheme thus, in some cases, inherently allows the burden to shift
back to the plaintiff even though the defendant has presented
something less than a reasonable factor other than age, as required
by the ADEA. So long as the defendant presents evidence that raises
64. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 2000)).
65. Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254–55 (1981)).
66. Id. at 1075 (noting that a “defendant may not satisfy this burden by mere
argument, but must present evidence of the legitimate reason for its decision”).
67. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311.
68. Mayer, 318 F.3d at 807.
69. Dishonesty is inherent in a pretext, which is defined as “[a] false or weak reason or
motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
967 (abridged 7th ed. 2000). In contrast, something that is reasonable is fair or proper under
the circumstances. See id. at 1018.
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an issue of fact, the burden will shift. The ADEA-mandated showing
of reasonableness is not required, but rather a showing of facts that
70
might bear on the employer’s decision.
Of course, the plaintiff will sustain no injury if she can rebut the
defendant’s proffered reasons. Conversely, though, the plaintiff will
be severely injured in instances where she has enough evidence to
assert a prima facie case, but not enough evidence to rebut the
defendant’s pretext. As noted, in order to present a prima facie case,
a plaintiff must show that she was over forty years old, that she was
terminated, that she was meeting the defendant employer’s
reasonable employment expectations, and that the plaintiff was
71
replaced by someone younger. Those four factors require very little
in the way of evidence: age and termination are easy to prove, as is
the age of replacement workers, and a plaintiff can demonstrate that
she was meeting the defendant’s reasonable expectations by
proffering easily obtainable performance review records. Proving a
pretext, however, requires a considerably higher showing of
evidence: the plaintiff must show that she was the “victim of
intentional discrimination by showing that the employer’s proffered
72
explanation is unworthy of credence.” To say that a reason for
terminating an employee is pretextual is to say that, even though the
reason might be valid, the employer was looking for an excuse to
terminate an older employee and that it used that reason as an
excuse. Employees may not be able to meet such a high burden, and
therefore their ADEA claims may fail even if the defendant employer
73
does not present evidence of a reasonable factor other than age.

70. Consequently, the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” and “reasonable factor
other than age” tests might not be synonymous. If the presentation of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for an employer’s action requires only the presentation of evidence
sufficient to raise an issue of fact, it clearly does not rise to the level of reasonableness required
by the ADEA. Reasonableness would per se preclude a plaintiff from proving that the proffered
reason is a pretext because something that is reasonable is not pretextual. See id. at 967.
However, the presentation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, as defined as a showing
of an issue of material fact, obviously produces some pretexts—otherwise, the tripartite
burden-shifting scheme would not allow the defendant to foist its burden on the plaintiff to
show pretext.
71. See supra note 62.
72. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quotations
omitted).
73. Note that courts would not place too great a burden on the plaintiffs by requiring
them to prove that their employers’ proffered reasons are pretextual. Just as defendants should
not be able to escape liability by proffering something less than a reasonable factor other than

1111

BRO-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/29/2003 10:36 PM

[2003

Such a situation arose in the Eleventh Circuit in Walker v.
74
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. In that case, the
plaintiffs claimed that they were passed up for a job on the basis of
75
their age and gender. The Eleventh Circuit assumed that a prima
facie case existed with respect to at least one of the employers that
76
decided not to offer the plaintiffs a job, and the defendant
employer sought to rebut this prima facie case by setting forth
evidence demonstrating that the candidate the defendant in fact
77
hired was more qualified than the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to
rebut defendant’s reasons by arguing that they were more qualified
than the candidate actually hired and that the defendant had
78
deviated from its hiring practices. The Eleventh Circuit then
articulated an extraordinarily high burden for the plaintiffs to meet in
order to rebut the defendant’s proffered reasons and prove that they
were more qualified than the candidate that was actually hired: the
court required plaintiffs to “show more than superior qualifications;
rather, they must show that they were so much more qualified that
79
the disparity virtually jumps off the page and slaps one in the face.”
80
The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet that burden.
Similarly, though the court cited no explicit standard governing the
pretextuality of hiring procedures, the plaintiffs were nevertheless
unable to prove that hiring procedures were not satisfied; the court
held that evidence showing that the job opening was not posted was
not sufficient to rebut the employer’s proffered reasons because the
defendant testified that a decision to post was left to the discretion of
the human resources department and that the opening arose so late

age, employees should not be able to recover if they do not have sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that their employer discriminated against them because of their age. It is beyond
the scope of this Note to articulate a preferable procedure for adjudicating ADEA claims, but a
system that allowed plaintiffs to prove affirmatively at the outset that their employer
discriminated against them because of their age, and then shifted the burden to the defendants
to articulate reasonable factors other than age as an affirmative defense, would solve this
problem. Under such a scheme, both the plaintiff and the defendant would be required to
make their respective arguments with the maximum possible quantum of evidence.
74. 286 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 1273.
76. Id. at 1276.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1277.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1278.
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in the hiring process that there was no time to post. Tellingly, there
was no evidence of how long it actually took to post a job
82
opening —evidence that might have been helpful in proving that
the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. It is irrelevant to
the analysis of this Note whether the defendant’s proffered reasons
were actually pretextual; they very well could have been, but the
plaintiffs had virtually no hope of even rebutting that potential
83
pretext because of the high burden to which they were held. With
such a high burden of proof placed upon the plaintiffs, the defendant
84
could have proffered a pretext and succeeded, so long as its
proffered reasons created an issue of material fact.
Use of the tripartite burden-shifting scheme, as taken from the
85
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme, predates Adams in the
86
Eleventh Circuit and is in wide usage in virtually all the circuit
87
courts of appeal. As such, it is the generally accepted application (or
misapplication) of the ADEA’s reasonable factors test, in spite of its
elimination of the reasonable factors exception in some instances; it
is also the trend to which the Eleventh Circuit in Adams
88
conformed.

81. Id. at 1279.
82. Id.
83. Admittedly, this problem might occur in any Title VII case; indeed, in given
situations plaintiffs might not have enough evidence to prove that the reasons being proffered
by the defendants are pretextual. The difference between the application of a burden-shifting
scheme in Title VII and the ADEA is that the ADEA specifically mandates that employers
present evidence of “reasonable factors other than age” as part of their affirmative defense;
Title VII contains no such requirement. See infra Part V.D.
84. For obvious reasons, it will be difficult to find a case that makes clear that this has
happened; the crux of this analysis is the potential of undetected pretexts. For that reason, it is
sufficient for the purposes of this argument to demonstrate situations in which it could have
happened.
85. See infra Part IV.C.1.
86. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 2000).
87. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 78 (2d Cir. 2001); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc.,
308 F.3d 335, 338 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 314 F.3d
657, 663 (4th Cir. 2003); Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir.
2002); Wexler v. White’s Furniture, Inc., 2003 WL 169763, at *21 (6th Cir. 2003); Nawrot
v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2002); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271
F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the McDonnell Douglas approach); Garrett v. Hewlett
Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
310 F.3d 758, 761–62 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
88. A simple scheme that would allow a defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie
case would conform more completely with the text of the ADEA. Under that scheme, an

1113

BRO-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/29/2003 10:36 PM

[2003

B. How the Eleventh Circuit’s ADEA/Equal Pay Act Analogy Fits into
this Trend
The majority in Adams analogized between the ADEA and the
Equal Pay Act in an attempt to demonstrate that because the two
provisions had similar language, and the Equal Pay Act precludes
89
disparate impact, the ADEA must preclude disparate impact as well.
There is a serious flaw in that analysis, however, that further hints at
a judicial tendency to dilute the ADEA’s reasonable factors
exception. The Equal Pay Act permits gender discrimination if based
90
on a factor other than gender. The ADEA grants a similar provision
to employers with regard to age discrimination, but requires that the
employer present reasonable factors other than age to justify her
91
actions, rather than simply neutral factors. The analogy likely
achieves its intended result—to show that the ADEA precludes
disparate impact—but it may also have another result: to dilute the
meaning of the word “reasonable” as used in the ADEA. If the
Equal Pay Act and the ADEA are linguistically similar, and the Equal
Pay Act requires only a neutral factor, then it follows that the term
“reasonable” may have little or no substantive meaning. Such an
argument may at first seem speculative at best, but the text of the
Adams opinion unfortunately bears it out.
In footnote six to its decision, pertaining to its ADEA/Equal Pay
Act analogy, the Eleventh Circuit specifically recognizes the
difference between the “neutral factor” and “reasonable neutral
factor” language, as well as the possibility that the difference could
92
distinguish the two provisions and render the analogy ineffective.
The court concludes, however, that the difference is not sufficient to
93
preclude its analogy. In making this determination, the court
implicitly questions the difference between a “reasonable factor” and
a mere “factor” and concludes that the difference is at least minimal
enough for its analogy to proceed. If the difference between the two
provisions is so minimal, then it follows that the term “reasonable,”

employer defendant would have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case; if the
defendant could not, she would lose, but if so, she would successfully avoid liability.
89. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).
90. See supra note 11 for the text of the Equal Pay Act.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
92. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 n.6.
93. Id.
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in the court’s eyes, has no real substantive meaning. As such, the
court has suggested an interpretation of the term “reasonable” that
substantially limits its meaning and application, just like the tripartite
burden-scheme. Further credence to this argument is lent by the fact
that it is not unheard of for courts to dilute the term “reasonable”;
indeed, as already noted, courts have a history of doing so.
Post-Adams cases have not relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s
ADEA/Equal Pay Act analogy to lessen an employer’s burden of
94
proof. That analogy, however, is nevertheless troubling because it
illustrates judges’ willingness to dilute the reasonable factors
exception through means other than the application of Title VII
burden-shifting; instead of using that burden-shifting scheme, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the term “reasonable,” as used in the
ADEA’s reasonable factors exception, has potentially less meaning
than the plain language of that term suggests. The fact that that
interpretation has not yet been applied in other cases does not lessen
its import as an indicator of judicial willingness to marginalize that
term. As noted in the following section, there are significant
problems with limiting the reasonable factors exception by any
method: first, the application of Title VII burden-shifting to the
ADEA rests on unsound analysis; and second, diluting the
reasonability requirement would severely handicap future disparate
treatment plaintiffs—a result that flies in the face of Congress’s
intent in passing the ADEA. This section will address those points in
turn.
C. Problems with Diluting the Reasonability Requirement
1. The reasoning behind applying Title VII burden-shifting is unsound
The reasoning behind applying Title VII burden-shifting is
susceptible to criticism. That scheme originated in McDonnell
95
Douglas Corp. v. Green, which found that, in a Title VII claim, a
defendant may rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a
96
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the defendant’s action.
Later, several circuit court cases held that McDonnell Douglas’s Title
94. Eleventh Circuit cases have instead continued to apply Title VII burden-shifting in
ADEA cases. See Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003).
95. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
96. Id. at 802.
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VII burden-shifting rule was applicable in ADEA contexts. Then, in
98
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court
99
applied Title VII burden-shifting to decide an ADEA case.
Numerous cases have relied on Reeves as a justification for applying
100
Title VII burden shifting to ADEA cases, but it should be noted,
however, that in Reeves, the Supreme Court assumed without
deciding that the burden-shifting rule in McDonnell Douglas applies
101
to ADEA cases because the parties did not dispute the issue.
Indeed, in that case, the Court was not called upon to determine the
102
applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test to the ADEA. The
Court never considered the legal merits of such an application.
Moreover, a Title VII burden-shifting analysis is simply not
transferable to the ADEA; the provision on which an employer’s
burden of proof should turn in an ADEA case—“reasonable factors
103
other than age”—does not exist in Title VII. The plain language of
the ADEA requires a defendant employer to present evidence of
reasonable factors other than age; because Title VII has no similar
provision, the burden-shifting scheme employed in those cases does
not result in the harm that it does in ADEA cases because Title VII
provides no statutorily-defined standard that a defendant employer
must meet in making its defense.
There is no need to criticize the Supreme Court’s Reeves
decision; the Court decided only the issue before it and made an
inference, without deciding, to which the parties implicitly
consented. The decisions deserving criticism were made by the
circuit courts that view Reeves as giving legitimacy to a practice that

97. See, e.g., Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997).
98. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
99. Id. at 141–42.
100. See supra note 87 for a list of cases relying on Reeves to justify using the Title VII
burden-shifting scheme to ADEA cases.
101. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
102. Id. at 137 (noting that the issue to be resolved was “whether a defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case
of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action”; the issue therefore deals with a
plaintiff’s burden of proof, not a defendant’s). Note also that in O’Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996), Justice Scalia wrote that the Court had not yet
“had occasion to decide whether [the] application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is
correct.”
103. See infra Part V.D.
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had evidently been in place long before that case was decided.
Those decisions have laid the groundwork for virtually every circuit
to apply Title VII burden shifting in assessing an employer’s rebuttal
105
of an ADEA plaintiff’s prima facie case.
2. Diluting the reasonability requirement would frustrate legitimate
disparate treatment claims in contravention of congressional intent
Diluting or removing the reasonability requirement in any case
would severely handicap future age discrimination plaintiffs from
recovering under the ADEA. As noted, applying Title VII burden
shifting to ADEA cases would, in some cases, eliminate the
requirement that a defendant employer defend its actions by
106
presenting evidence of “reasonable factors other than age.” In
those cases, an employer could escape liability simply by raising an
issue of material fact rather than actually presenting the statutorilyrequired reasonable factors. Similarly, under the Eleventh Circuit’s
view, the term “reasonable” is so diluted that an employer could
escape liability simply by presenting evidence of “neutral” factors
107
other than age.
It is wise here to make a distinction in order to avoid a fatal
inconsistency in this Note’s argument. The reasonability required of
an employer to defend itself against a claim does not bear on the
kind of harm inflicted upon a plaintiff, but rather upon the level of
proof the employer must submit to justify its actions. As such, any
harm resulting from the dilution of the ADEA’s reasonability
requirement, whether that dilution is a result of the improper
application of Title VII burden shifting or an improper analogy, falls
on those claiming disparate treatment, not disparate impact, as the
basis for their claim, for, as already noted, the ADEA does not
recognize disparate impact. This distinction is necessary to avoid the
obvious inconsistency of first arguing that the ADEA precludes

104. See, e.g., Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997).
105. See supra note 87.
106. See supra Part IV.A.
107. For an example of how the Court’s Reeves decision has been misinterpreted and
used to complicate plaintiffs’ ADEA recovery potential, see Reeves Doesn’t Help Former
Employee’s ADEA Case, 17 No. 18 EMPLOYMENT ALERT at 8 (2000).
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disparate impact, and in turn arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s
108
decision unfairly limits plaintiffs’ recourse for age discrimination.
Making it more difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to
prevail is inconsistent with the congressionally-stated purpose of the
ADEA. Congress intended that Act “to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age” and “to prohibit
109
In so stating,
arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”
Congress clearly intended to allow liability for the disparate
110
treatment of workers based on age. That is the rule Congress set
forth, and it is subject only to the exclusion of disparate impact,
defined as behavior motivated by “reasonable factors other than
age.” Any dilution or elimination of the term “reasonable,” as used
in the ADEA, therefore flies in the face of this goal. Such a dilution
would lower the standard that an allegedly infringing employer
would have to meet to justify its actions, making it easier for that
employer to escape the very liability Congress intended to impose on
discriminating employers.
V. THE ANALYSIS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED
The Eleventh Circuit could have avoided participating in the
trend to dilute the reasonable factors exception by relying on the
plain language of the ADEA. This section will first make the plain
language argument that the court should have made. It will then
demonstrate that that analysis is consistent with Supreme Court
statements on the issue, the ADEA’s legislative history, and the
Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to analogize between Title VII and the
ADEA.
A. The Plain Language of the ADEA
The main point of contention in interpreting the plain language
of the ADEA lies in section 623(f)(1), which permits otherwise
discriminatory behavior if (1) “age is a bona fide occupational

108. It must be borne in mind that there are two kinds of age discrimination plaintiffs:
one whose claims are indeed unfairly affected, and another who never had a claim at all under
the ADEA.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
110. For a more in-depth treatment of the ADEA’s legislative history and purpose,
including its distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact liability, see infra
Part V.C.
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qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business” (the business necessity defense); (2) “where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age”; or (3)
“where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country, and compliance [with the Act] would cause such
employer . . . to violate the laws of the country in which such
111
workplace is located.” Those that would accept disparate impact in
ADEA jurisprudence hold that section 623(f)(1) is merely a
112
codification of the recognized business necessity defense. That
argument “is based on the premise that Congress did not intend to
prohibit age discrimination in [section] 623(a) and then approve of
113
differentiation on the basis of age in [section] 623(f)(1).” Thus,
those that would admit disparate impact into ADEA jurisprudence
see the business necessity exception as swallowing the reasonable
factors exception, indeed, making all three exceptions “bona fide
occupational qualification[s] reasonably necessary to the normal
114
operation of the particular business” and giving the “reasonable
factors” exception no meaning independent from the business
necessity exception.
That interpretation, however, does not stand up to accepted
standards of statutory interpretation. Indeed, it is well recognized

111. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
112. The concurrence in Adams is an example of this. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255
F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring) (“Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA
should not be interpreted as anything more than a statutory description of the business
necessity defense.”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems clear . . . that
§ 4(f)(1) simply codifies the business necessity defense.”).
Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Francis W. Parker School is probably the seminal argument for
holding that section 623(f)(1) simply codifies the business necessity defense. See Nathan E.
Holmes, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Are Disparate Impact
Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 311–13, 323–25 (2000) (analyzing Judge
Cudahy’s dissent); Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument
Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 625, 641 (1996) (noting Judge Cudahy’s dissent); Jacob N. Lesser, Note, No ADEA
Liability for Employment Decisions Based on Nonpretextual Factors Closely Correlated with Age:
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 37 B.C. L. REV. 374, 380–81 (1996); Brendan Sweeney,
Comment, “Downsizing” the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Availability of
Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527, 1566 (1996).
113. Sweeney, supra note 112, at 1548.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
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that statutes ought to be construed so as to eliminate superfluities.
Moreover, “when ‘two words or expressions are coupled together,
one of which generically includes the other, it is obvious that the
more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific
116
one.’” With respect to the ADEA, therefore, the reasonable factors
and the foreign law exceptions simply cannot be mere incarnations
or examples of the business necessity defense; if they were, they
would be superfluous. Indeed, the general term or expression—in
this case, the business necessity defense—must be assigned a
meaning that excludes the other two exceptions. Moreover, to avoid
further superfluity, the reasonable factors exception must be
interpreted so as to be distinct from the foreign law exception.
Therefore, all three exceptions must be distinct and independent
from one another.
That the business necessity and reasonable factors exceptions are
distinguishable is borne out by the text of the provision. Section
623(f)(1) holds that discriminatory action is excusable if (a) it is
based on “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business”; or (b) “where
117
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”
In other words, the business necessity exception is invoked when age
is a determining factor in the employer’s allegedly discriminatory
action, but the reasonable factors exception is invoked where age is
118
not a determining factor in the employment practice.
Given that the three exceptions listed in section 623(f)(1) must
be construed so as to be distinct and independent from one another,
the reasonable factors exception must be construed according to its
plain language and not in relation to the other two exceptions. The
plain language—that otherwise discriminatory behavior is acceptable

115. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”)
(quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
116. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 445
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 266, at 349 (1891)).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
118. See also Querry, supra note 56, at 578–79 (noting that the business necessity defense
is incompatible with the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” exception because the
business necessity defense requires a showing of necessity, while the “reasonable factors” test
requires only a showing of reasonableness).
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“where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age”—is synonymous with the definition of disparate impact already
given in this Note: “employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
119
necessity.” Indeed, a practice cannot be neutral on its face unless it
is based on “reasonable factors other than age.” The “reasonable
factors” exception is therefore a plain language preclusion of
120
disparate impact from the ADEA.
This plain language argument achieves what the Adams majority
set out to do: hold that the ADEA precludes disparate impact
liability. It does so without lowering defendant employers’ burden of
proof. As demonstrated in the following sections, this analysis is
consistent with the correct points of the Adams rationale. While the
Supreme Court has not issued any statements of precedential weight
on whether disparate impact is a cognizable injury under the ADEA,
and the Eleventh Circuit was therefore incorrect in relying on those
statements as if they had such weight, those statements do indicate
the Court’s inclination to preclude disparate impact from ADEA
jurisprudence. Also, the plain language analysis presented in this
Note is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s contentions that
allowing the ADEA to recognize disparate impact runs contrary to

119. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Note that
the definition of disparate impact from Teamsters adds the requirement that the practice
“cannot be justified by business necessity.” This construction makes the facial neutrality of the
practice subordinate to business necessity. In other words, even if the practice is facially
neutral, it still produces a disparate impact if it cannot be justified as a business necessity. This,
at first, seems to contradict this Note’s previous conclusion that section 623(f)(1)’s reasonable
factors exception was distinct and independent from the business necessity defense, given that
the section 623(f)(1) reasonable factors exception and the Teamsters definition are one and the
same. It must be borne in mind, though, that Teamsters is a Title VII case, not an ADEA case.
While Teamsters provides a useful, general definition of disparate impact, Title VII does not
contain a “reasonable factors other than age” exception to its prohibitions. See infra Part V.D.
As such, the fact that the Teamsters definition subordinates a practice’s facial neutrality to
business necessity is irrelevant in the present case. See Holmes, supra note 112, at 325 (“There
is no good reason to equate the burden of showing that a decision was reasonable, with that of
establishing that the decision was a necessity.”).
120. For other opinions on why the ADEA should be interpreted to preclude disparate
impact claims, see Herbert & Shelton, supra note 112, at 650–60 (arguing that allowing
disparate impact claims under the ADEA would impermissibly produce jury trials of
complicated statistical issues); Sweeney, supra note 112, at 1533–34 (concluding that the
ADEA precludes disparate impact liability but that the ADEA should be amended to include
disparate impact).
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Congress’s intent and that Title VII and the ADEA are really not
analogous. In short, then, if the Eleventh Circuit had relied on this
plain language analysis, it could have retained these valid and true
points while avoiding participation in a trend that is damaging to
future disparate treatment plaintiffs.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has commented on whether the ADEA
permits disparate impact claims. Those statements come in the form
of concurring and dissenting opinions that obviously have no
precedential value. Those statements uniformly hold that the ADEA
does not permit disparate impact claims, and therefore reinforce the
plain language argument made in the preceding section.
In 1981, Justice Rehnquist vigorously dissented from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Markham v. Geller, an appeal
121
from the Second Circuit. That case dealt with a fifty-five-year-old
teacher with thirteen years of teaching experience who was denied a
job in favor of a twenty-six-year-old teacher with three years of
experience. The offending school board had enacted a policy of only
recruiting teachers who would be paid below the “sixth step” on the
district’s pay scale, thus precluding the hiring of any teachers with
122
more than five years of experience. The Court of Appeals found in
favor of the fifty-five-year-old teacher on the ground that there had
not been a sufficient showing of business necessity and that the
district’s budgetary policy had an unfair, disproportionate impact on
123
teachers between the ages of forty and sixty-five. In arguing that
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to reverse the Court of
Appeals’ erroneous holding, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court
[had] never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a
violation of the ADEA, and it certainly has never sanctioned a
finding of a violation where the statistical evidence revealed that a
policy, neutral on its face, has such a significant impact on all
124
candidates concerned, not simply the protected age group.

121.
122.
123.
124.
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Moreover, Justice Rehnquist argued that the section 623(f)(1)
language allowing apparently discriminatory action “where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age”
indicates a Congressional intent to exclude disparate impact from
125
ADEA jurisprudence.
The majority in the Hazen Paper decision also weighed in on the
issue of whether disparate impact liability is permissible under the
ADEA. It noted that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence
of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired
because the employer believes that productivity and competence
126
decline with old age.” Also, the majority explained that “Congress’
promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that older
workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of
127
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.” Therefore, “[w]hen the
employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age,
the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes
128
disappears.” Justice Kennedy, along with the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas, concurred in the Hazen Paper decision. In that
concurrence, those Justices noted that “there are substantial
arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis
129
from Title VII to the ADEA.”
130
Though not binding as precedent, these statements bring to
light key arguments against allowing disparate impact claims under

125. Id. at 948–49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000)).
126. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 611.
129. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Several cases rely on these dissenting and
concurring opinions to support the proposition that disparate impact cannot form a basis for
liability under the ADEA. See Evans v. Atwood, 38 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30 (D.D.C. 1999); Hyman
v. First Union Corp., 980 F. Supp. 38, 40–41 (D.D.C. 1997); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp.,
959 F. Supp. 742, 746 (E.D. Va. 1997); Lumpkin v. Brown, 898 F. Supp. 1263, 1270 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (referring to Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari
in Markham v. Geller).
130. These statements, though helpful in determining how at least a few members of the
Supreme Court would hold if presented with the Adams case, are not binding as precedent;
reliance on these statements as anything more than an indication of the Court’s leanings or a
presentation of well-reasoned counterarguments is therefore inappropriate. The precedential
weight of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent may be disposed of quickly, for it is common knowledge
that dissenting opinions carry no precedential weight. Mark C. Rahdert, Sprague v. Casey and
its Seven Deadly Sins, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 625, 635–36 (1989) (“First year law students are
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the ADEA. Though the Adams court was incorrect in relying on
these statements as precedent, it correctly noted that the Supreme
Court, if given the chance, is likely inclined to hold that disparate
impact has no place in ADEA jurisprudence. Relying on a plain
language argument to interpret the ADEA, as the Eleventh Circuit
should have done, would have been entirely consistent with these
statements, and would have allowed the Eleventh Circuit to reach
the same result without reducing a defendant employer’s burden of
rebuttal.
C. Analysis of Congress’s Intent in Enacting the ADEA
The Supreme Court has noted that statutory language is
conclusive “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
131
contrary.” In other words, if Congress has expressed an intention,
that intention must govern any interpretation of a statute’s plain
language. This rule of statutory construction seems to fly in the face
of the preceding analysis of the ADEA’s language because in its

taught as one of their earliest lessons that dissenting opinions are not controlling authority for
anything.”).
Similarly, concurring opinions should only be granted precedential weight in certain
situations. Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995). A concurrence is a “simple
concurrence” if it agrees only with the majority’s result, possibly proposing an alternative
rationale; a concurrence is a “concurrence in judgment” if it agrees with both the majority’s
result and reasoning. Id. at 2084–85. Concurrences in judgment merit little precedential
deference. Id. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hazen Paper is likely a concurrence in
judgment, as it adopts both the majority’s rationale and its conclusion, adding only that
“nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the socalled ‘disparate impact’ theory of Title VII.” Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Finally, the majority’s statements in Hazen Paper should not be accorded precedential
authority because the majority was deciding a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact
case. In his complaint, respondent Biggins “claimed that age had been a determinative factor in
[the Hazen Paper Company’s] decision to fire him.” Id. at 606. Because his claim
encompassed only action taken with age as a motivating factor, his claim was one of disparate
treatment, not disparate impact. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977) (noting that in disparate treatment situations, “[t]he employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, [or other
protected characteristics].”) Justice Kennedy conceded this point when he noted that Biggins
had “advanced no claim that petitioners’ use of an employment practice that has a
disproportionate effect on older workers violates the ADEA.” Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618
(Kennedy, J., concurring). As such, the majority’s statements on disparate impact are dicta.
131. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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statement of findings incident to the purpose of the ADEA,
Congress noted that “the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of
potential for job performance has become a common practice, and
certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
132
older persons.” This language seems, at first glance, to invoke the
commonly accepted definition of disparate impact, which “involve[s]
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
133
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Implicitly,
then, if Congress noted in its findings of fact that disparate impact
was prevalent, it must have intended the ADEA to prohibit, rather
than permit, disparate impact claims.
The problem with that analysis is that it confuses legislative
findings and legislative intent. Indeed, “[w]here the language
Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous,” it is
presumed “that Congress said what it meant and meant what it
134
said.” In section 621(b) of the ADEA, Congress stated that the
ADEA’s purpose was “to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age” and “to prohibit arbitrary age
135
discrimination in employment.” Precluding disparate impact is
entirely consistent with this purpose. Indeed, the classic disparate
impact situation—a neutral policy that disproportionately affects
older workers—likely bears on an employee’s ability rather than age
and, if based on a standardized policy, is not arbitrary at all. The fact
that Congress made a finding and excluded it from its statement of
purpose may even indicate that Congress deliberated on whether to
allow disparate impact claims, but ultimately decided against it.
Moreover, the ADEA is the result of a study performed by the
136
Secretary of Labor on age discrimination. The study distinguished

132. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
133. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15; Faillace, supra note 26, at 211.
134. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). Note the
distinction between the language of the statute and the language Congress used to express its
intent in enacting the statute.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
136. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229–31
(1983) (detailing the production of the Secretary of Labor’s THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN
WORKER] and explaining that “[t]he product of the process of factfinding [sic] and
deliberation formally begun in 1964 was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967”); see also Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the
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between discrimination based on stereotypes (disparate treatment)
and “problems resulting from factors that ‘affect older workers more
strongly, as a group, than they do younger employees,’ (disparate
137
impact).” Based on that distinction, the study suggested that
Congress prohibit only the former type of discrimination; disparate
138
impact was to be resolved through other measures. Therefore,
Congress, basing the ADEA on the Secretary’s report, did not intend
the ADEA to prohibit disparate impact. The Adams court correctly
noted that distinction, and the plain language argument presented
139
herein is consistent with that policy.
D. The Inappropriateness of Analogizing Between
Title VII and the ADEA
The Adams court also correctly noted that Title VII and the
ADEA are not analogous because the ADEA allows employers to
take an otherwise prohibited action so long as that action is “based
140
on reasonable factors other than age.” Title VII contains no such
141
provision. To argue that the ADEA should permit disparate impact
claims because Title VII does so is to ignore this fundamental
difference in the language of the two provisions.
Moreover, a comparison between the two provisions misstates
the real issue. The analogy between Title VII and the ADEA harks
142
back to the Supreme Court’s statement in Lorillard v. Pons that
“the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title
143
144
VII.” That indeed may be true, but whether the ADEA permits
Secretary’s report “served as a principal impetus for the ADEA”); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,
73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “Congress enacted the ADEA in large
part” on the Secretary of Labor’s report).
Note that, “[b]ecause other materials are sparse, discussions of the ADEA’s legislative
history usually focus on the Secretary’s Report.” Michael C. Sloan, Disparate Impact in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 507, 512 (1995), cited in Ellis, 73 F.3d
at 1008.
137. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (quoting THE AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 136, at 5,
11).
138. Id. (citing THE AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 136, at 21–25).
139. See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2001).
140. Id. at 1325 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)).
141. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Title VII
contains no provision parallel to the ‘reasonable factors other than age’ language in the
ADEA.”).
142. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
143. Id. at 584.
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disparate impact claims requires an analysis not of the ADEA’s
prohibitions, but of the exceptions to otherwise prohibited conduct
listed in section 623(f) of that Act. Indeed, the issue is whether the
“reasonable factors other than age” exception listed in section 623(f)
precludes disparate impact suits under the ADEA; that language is
listed among the exceptions to the ADEA’s general policy of
prohibiting age discrimination and is not incorporated into any of
the ADEA’s explicit prohibitions. Logically, that language could not
rest among the prohibitions, for it speaks to conduct that is
permitted, not prohibited. Comparing Title VII to the ADEA frames
the issue as resting with the prohibitions, when the prohibitions are
not in doubt; it is the exceptions that have given courts the greatest
headaches.
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding Adams v. Florida Power Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
got the right result in resolving the circuit split—disparate impact is
not a viable theory of recovery under the ADEA—through the
wrong analysis. It should have analyzed the ADEA’s plain language,
which is dispositive, instead of justifying its exclusion of disparate
impact from the ADEA on the ground that the EPA, rather than
Title VII, is analogous to the ADEA. By relying on the plain
language, the court could have avoided participating in a tradition
that is both poorly reasoned and severely detrimental to future age
discrimination plaintiffs, while still achieving the same correct result.
Daniel K. Brough

144. See supra note 12 for a comparison of the prohibitionary language in both
provisions.
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